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Abstract 
The resilience of customary law systems of natural resource governance in many parts of the 
world lends credence to Ostrom’s theory on the governance of commons. Ostrom argued that 
resource users who enjoy relative autonomy in the design of rules for governing and managing 
common-pool resources, frequently achieve better economic (as well as more equitable) 
outcomes than when experts do this for them.2 In support of this theory and acknowledging 
that most common pool resource governance regimes are based on a customary law system, 
Bosselman has sought to demonstrate a link between customary law systems and positive 
outcomes for sustainable development.3 Using a case study of the customary law system of 
water governance of the Marakwet community of Kenya, this paper tests and builds on the 
design principles and tools developed by Ostrom, to study normative institutions in a dynamic 
environment.4 The paper proposes an analytical framework that helps identify the features that 
strengthen customary institutions and ensure their adaptability and resource sustainability. This 
exercise illustrates the parallels between commons governance and customary law governance 
of natural resources. 
Keywords: commons, common pool resources, customary, law, natural resource governance, 
irrigation system, sustainability, sustainable development, property, water
1 Elizabeth Gachenga (PhD) is a law lecturer and researcher at Strathmore Law School in Nairobi, Kenya. This paper is based on 
research undertaken as part of her doctoral research at the University of Western Sydney. Email e.gachenga@gmail.com
2 (Ostrom 1990); (Agrawal and Gupta 2005); (Gibson, McKean, and Ostrom 2000); (Tang and Ostrom 1993); (Schlager and Ostrom 
1992); (Ostrom and Basurto 2011)
3 (Bosselman 2005)
4 (Ostrom and Basurto 2009)
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Plate 1: The River Embobut, which is the source of the irrigation furrows used by the 
Marakwet people. (Photo credit: Elizabeth Gachenga)
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THE CONCEPTS OF CUSTOMARY LAW 
AND COMMON POOL RESOURCE 
GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS
Common pool resource (CPR) governance 
systems refer to the various models of norms 
and institutions used by communities to 
manage the use of a shared resource. The 
field of CPR governance gained popularity in 
the 1990s following the publication of Elinor 
Ostrom’s book: Governing the Commons: The 
Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action.5 
Her work provided a highly insightful critique 
into the theoretical foundations of prevalent 
policy on natural resource governance, and 
motivated a reconsideration of the two-
dimensional approach to the ‘problem’ of 
limiting the governance of common pool 
resources to state or ‘market’ (through 
privatisation) solutions. 
Most of the work done in the area of CPR 
governance has been contextualized 
in economics and more specifically in 
institutional economics. However, since 
the publication of Ostrom’s book, legal 
property theorists have also demonstrated 
an interest in the conclusion she drew; 
that tragedy is not a necessary fate for all 
commons. Consequently, in legal property 
literature, there is a growing appreciation 
of successful institutional arrangements for 
the management of commons that do not 
fall within the two-dimensional framework 
of private property or state control.6 Despite 
reference by legal property theory to Ostrom’s 
work, its practical implications have not been 
widely researched in the context of law. This 
paper seeks to explore one such application by 
investigating the linkages between the work of 
Ostrom and colleagues on the commons, and 
customary law governance systems for natural 
resources such as water. 
Modern legal frameworks tend to associate 
customary law systems with the traditional 
norms and practices that local and indigenous 
communities have crafted/developed over 
an extended period of time. Although it is 
true that these systems are often closely 
related to long-standing activities of resource-
dependent people, customary law constitutes 
a more dynamic reality. In this paper, the term 
‘customary law systems’ refers to the norms 
and institutions whose moral authority and 
force emanates from the contemporary as 
well as traditional culture, customs, religious 
beliefs, ideas or practices of the people to 
whom it applies, rather than from the state.7 
Notions such as ‘community-based’, ‘informal’ 
or ‘local’ forms of governance are used 
regardless of their antiquity or association 
with tradition. In this context, customary 
law systems of resource governance are 
understood as a popular normative pattern 
reflecting the common understanding of valid 
compulsory rights and obligations relating to 
the resource. 
Customary law systems for natural resources 
governance provide an ideal opportunity 
for investigating the emerging theories on 
commons’ governance in a legal context. This 
is because most customary law systems of 
natural resource governance are based on a 
CPR governance system. In recognition of this, 
Ørebech et al (2005) have sought to explore 
the implications of commons governance 
research on customary law, suggesting a 
link between customary law and sustainable 
development.8 This paper contributes to 
these efforts by exploring how Ostrom’s work 
on commons can be applied to customary 
law systems for water resource governance. 
Focusing on a case study of the Marakwet 
people of western Kenya, and by applying 
Ostrom’s work to Ørebech et al’s research 
into customary law systems, I propose an 
analytical framework to help identify the 
main features of successful customary law 
systems for natural resource governance. The 
paper confirms that parallels do exist between 
the salient design principles identified by 
Ostrom and others as indicators of successful 
5 (Ostrom 1990)
6 (Rose 1986)
7 This definition is adapted from that of the International Council on Human Rights Policy. See (Policy 2009) 43.
8 (Ørebech et al. 2005)
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commons institutions and features of resilient 
customary law systems of governance. Above 
all, it establishes that customary law systems 
that enjoy autonomy over the design of rules 
and norms, and which are open to adaptation 
and change, are more likely to result in 
positive sustainable resource governance 
outcomes. 
MARAKWET’S CUSTOMARY LAW 
SYSTEM FOR WATER GOVERNANCE
The Marakwet community of Kenya have a 
tradition of customary law and governance 
that predates colonial rule.9 The community’s 
customary law also forms the backbone of 
a robust water resource governance regime 
based on an irrigation system that runs along 
more than 40km of the Marakwet Escarpment 
from south of Arror to north of Tot.10 The 
community practices a form of hill furrow 
irrigation common in East Africa, described 
as a slope off-take irrigation system. The 
irrigation furrows of the Marakwet, which 
date back to the initial occupation of the 
community in the valley, more than 200 
hundred years ago, are the main source of 
freshwater resources both for agricultural 
and domestic use. As the country’s oldest 
customary irrigation system, the Marakwet’s 
water governance system thus provides an 
excellent case for analysis of a customary law 
system of water resource governance in Kenya. 
Methodology
The primary data used for this case is based 
on a field study conducted from November 
2010 to February 2011. A qualitative research 
methodology was used that combined various 
data collection methods, including semi-
structured interviews, three focus group 
discussions, and participant observation. The 
population sampled came from Sambalat, the 
area of Marakwet that borders West Pokot. 
The participants of the first focus group 
discussion were purposefully chosen 
from among clan council elders who are 
responsible for management of the furrows 
and thus knowledgeable on customary 
law norms and institutions for water 
governance in the community. The objective 
of the focus group discussion was to provide 
background information on the furrows, 
their management, and allow for an in-depth 
analysis of the Marakwet’s customary law 
system for water governance. 
Under this customary law system, women 
do not have a direct role in the management 
of the irrigation system. This research 
nevertheless sought to obtain the views of 
female members of the community and to 
determine the extent of their participation in 
the design and implementation of customary 
rules for water governance. A focus group 
discussion was thus organised with both 
a selection of older and younger women. 
The stratification of age groups was useful 
to determine if perspectives around the 
perceived roles of women in water governance 
had changed over time. 
Data was also collected from randomly 
selected water users with the aid of semi-
structured questionnaires. Forty-three water 
users, consisting of men and women of 
different ages and from different households, 
were interviewed. Interviews were also 
conducted with the local chief of the area, an 
official working in the Eldoret Water Services 
Company (ELDOWAS) and a representative of 
the Lake Victoria North Water Services Board 
(LVNWSB) Office in Eldoret.
The Marakwet’s Customary Law System for 
Water Governance
Among the Marakwet community, it was 
clear that customary law continues to play 
a central role in societal life. In the case of 
water resource governance, customary law 
constitutes the primary regulatory framework 
for managing shared water resources. 
Community members demonstrated a keen 
knowledge of their customary water resource 
governance system. The clan elders in charge 
9 This is evidenced by the early accounts of the Marakwet’s law and custom. For example (Beech 1921)
10 (Watson, Adams, and Mutiso 1998)
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of furrows explained that the origin of the 
system dates back more than two centuries. 
According to oral histories, the first four 
furrows, belonging to the Lakeno, Kapterit, 
Shaban and Kabishoi clans, were constructed 
in 1882. Construction of the furrows was 
triggered by drought in the region. Irrigation 
furrows were considered the only means by 
which to bring water from the Embobut River 
to people on the valley floor, which lies more 
than 1000m below the escarpment. 
An important feature of Marakwet’s customary 
water governance system is that it is entirely 
home grown or autochthonous, with the 
norms that underpin the system developed 
solely by the community. In the case of local 
water law, the rules governing development 
and use were designed by the clan elders, 
in consultation with the wider community, 
following construction of the furrows. This 
autonomy in design (both in terms of rules 
and their implementation) is considered 
sacrosanct. One discussant expressed the 
centrality of autonomy in the following way, 
‘There is no law that will come to tell us who 
will or how we will use the water. The water is 
for us and for our children from our elders. No 
one will tell us how to use it’.11
Although ultimately geared towards 
conservation and sustainability of the water 
resource, the scope of their customary 
water law is relatively broad and includes 
directives on the use of land and other 
natural resources. While the rationale for 
crafting rules is often based on environmental 
indicators, the connection between rules and 
ecological conditions is not always evident. 
For instance, some of the rules and norms are 
encoded within a sacred religious system that 
include taboos and prohibitions associated 
with the felling of trees, the contamination 
of furrow water, or the requirement to plant 
indigenous trees, which are regarded as 
sacred, around rivers and streams. In the 
course of discussion with village elders, it 
was confirmed that the underlying objective 
of these rules is to conserve water resources 
and foster a sense of respect for water among 
community members.
Although the clan council in charge of 
the furrows are viewed as custodians of 
customary law on water resources, the 
design, implementation and modification 
of the rules is carried out through a broad 
consultative process. Consequently, rules 
are subject to negotiation and modification 
with relative ease. For instance, most of the 
water users interviewed talked about the 
rule that stipulates how households whose 
male members do not contribute to furrow 
maintenance and repairs are not entitled 
to water provided by the irrigation system. 
However, before this rule is implemented, 
there is a consultative process in which the 
offender is given an opportunity to present 
his case. Depending on the reason for 
default, other sanctions may be applied to 
avoid punishing the entire household, such 
as a monetary fine. Young clan members 
unavailable for furrow work due to school or 
work commitments outside of the community 
may substitute their physical labour with 
monetary compensation.
This type of rule modification can be seen as 
a response to emerging circumstances. While 
based largely on norms and practices that 
date back many years, there are still changes 
that the rule system of the Marakwet has 
undergone in recent times. For instance, the 
custodian of the customary law system was 
traditionally a group of clan elders selected on 
the basis of their age and thus knowledge and 
experience of the furrow system. However, 
recognising the value of formal education, the 
community has begun to allow some younger 
community members to join the clan council. 
While obviously lacking in experience, 
younger members are often very resourceful 
and savvy in their relations with external 
organisations and donor agencies, as well as 
holding greater knowledge of (potentially 
useful) new technologies.
11 Focus Group Discussion with Clan Elders and Representatives of Furrows Council (Marakwet District- Kenya, February 10 2010)
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REVISITING THE DESIGN PRINCIPLES 
OF SUSTAINABLE COMMONS 
MANAGEMENT AND THEIR 
APPLICATION TO CUSTOMARY LAW 
SYSTEMS
As noted in the introduction, Ostrom’s 
Governing the Commons illustrated how 
different communities develop rule-based 
institutional arrangements for the sustainable 
management of their shared natural 
resources. Ostrom’s analysis culminated in 
the identification of eight design principles 
that appeared characteristic of successful 
commons management regimes.12
Salient Features of Successful CPR 
Systems and their Application to Resilient 
Customary Law Systems
One of the fundamental observations made 
by Ostrom is that appropriators who enjoy 
relative autonomy from government or 
other external actors in the design of their 
institutional arrangements are more likely to 
develop sustainable management regimes.13 
Such autonomy ensures that the users of the 
resource play a role not only in the design 
but also the modification of the rules that 
regulate access and use. The case studies also 
demonstrated that CPR governance systems 
with collective choice arrangements (that 
allow individuals affected by operational 
rules to participate in their modification) 
often result in positive outcomes.14 Apart 
from participating in rule modification, the 
users in these successful CPR systems are also 
charged with the implementation of those 
rules15, as supported by subsequent research 
that analysed multiple communal irrigation 
systems in Nepal.16 
Based on the work of Ostrom and others, 
Ørebech et al (2005) argued that adaptability 
is also an indispensable characteristic of 
success in any complex resource management 
system.17 Adaptability relates to the inherent 
capacity of a system not only to deal with the 
present but also continue to be relevant in the 
future. In other words, a system that has the 
capacity to adapt to changing conditions. Given 
that the social, economic and ecological factors 
that impinge upon and influence natural 
resources use and management are in a state 
of constant flux, any ideal system of resource 
management needs to be capable of adapting 
itself to such changes, whether anticipated 
or not.18 This is what Ostrom and Basurto 
(2011) were pointing to when stating that CPR 
governance systems, in order to be successful, 
need to have a tested capacity for adaptability 
and openness to change;19 typically by 
means of a normative system that exhibits 
substantial variety in its rules, with changes 
in rules driven by institutional memory as 
well as socio-economic and/or environmental 
change.20
As a result of their genesis and nature, 
customary governance systems also tend 
towards versatility and flexibility in the 
sense that rules and institutions reflect 
the prevalent social, economic, cultural, 
political and ecological circumstances in 
which they operate.21 To this extent, such 
systems contain an inherent adaptive 
mechanism that makes them suitable for 
natural resource management. However, as 
noted by Bosselman, not all customary law 
systems integrate this adaptive management 
strategy effectively.22 A successful customary 
law system will recognise the structure of 
adaptations that it has made in the past and 
it is this that offers an effective vehicle for 
making changes to existing rules, encourages 
fine-grained rules that can be modified 
without having to modify the entire system, 
and has a meaningful feedback mechanism in 
place.23
Bosselman’s principles of resilient customary 
law systems are comparable to the design 
principles identified by Ostrom and built upon 
by others, and the synergy that exists between 
the two will be looked at in more detail in the 
following section. 
12 (Ostrom 1990)
13 (Ostrom 1990), 101
14 (Ostrom 1990), 93
15 (Ostrom 1990), 94
16 (Ostrom and Basurto 2011)
17 (Bosselman 2005) 245
18 (Ørebech et al. 2005)
19 (Ostrom and Basurto 2011) 
20 (Ostrom and Basurto 2011), 336
21 See for example (Australian Law Reform 
Commission 1986) for the Australian Aborigi-
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AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR 
IDENTIFYING SUCCESSFUL CUSTOMARY 
LAW SYSTEMS OF NATURAL RESOURCE 
GOVERNANCE 
Figure 1 encapsulates some of the main 
contributing factors that lie behind the success 
of customary law systems for natural resource 
governance. Departing from the premises 
put forward by Ostrom and building on 
Bosselman’s work, the framework identifies 
five main indicators of successful systems all 
of which are dependent on users enjoying 
some level of autonomy in system design and 
implementation.
1. Knowledge Management System
Both Ostrom’s and Ørebech’s work point 
to the need for a rational process for the 
development and modification of rules in 
order for any normative CPR governance 
framework to work effectively. Based on 
insights drawn from the Marakwet case study, 
this paper recognises this crucial feature and 
develops it further. 
First, any successful customary system for 
governing a CPR needs to have a record (oral 
or written) of how the system works under 
different conditions and that this knowledge 
and experience ought to be institutionalised. 
The term ‘knowledge management’ is used 
to denote this characteristic. For purposes 
of this framework, knowledge management 
signifies the capacity of the normative system 
to identify the insights and experiences 
necessary to develop rules that result in 
the sustainable governance of common 
pool resources. Knowledge management 
thus implies the capacity to capture the 
accumulated experiences of responses to 
environmental, socio-economic or other types 
of change. It is this record of past experiences 
that forms the basis for institutional memory 
and a repository of knowledge that is 
maintained for the purposes of improving the 
system down the road. 
An insight into the importance of this 
feature was gained during fieldwork 
among the Marakwet. Through focus group 
discussions, the responses of water users, 
and the observations of the researcher, it was 
evident that an implicit system existed for 
accumulating knowledge of the conditions 
affecting water resources and associated 
rule system. Most interview respondents 
demonstrated knowledge of the origin of 
the furrow system in response to prolonged 
drought in the valley and of their water 
rules. The rationale for the rules and their 
relation to past experiences was not always 
evident as respondents often associated 
non-compliance of the rules with taboos 
and religious sanctions. However, as noted 
in the focus group discussions, clan elders 
explained that the objectives of water rules 
Figure 1: Framework for Analysing Successful Customary Law Systems of Water Resource Governance
Knowledge 
Management System
Oral or written record of 






Right information of current 
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Stratification of Rules 
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stratified to allow for partial 
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were the preservation of water resources, 
environmental conservation, or the socio-
economic welfare of local people. 
2. Feedback Mechanism
A second feature characteristic of successful 
customary law systems is the presence of a 
feedback mechanism. A successful system 
must have ways of ensuring that accurate 
information is promptly fed back into the 
system and that information then used in the 
decision making process.24 This mechanism 
is dependent on the knowledge management 
system, which ensures that relevant 
information is captured and used to drive the 
appropriate adaptation of resource rules and 
institutions. 
The Marakwet’s customary water governance 
system provides clear evidence of this. The 
flexibility of rules on water and land use point 
to their adaptation to ecological conditions. 
For instance, while commercial mango 
farming was not a traditional practice among 
the community, many women are currently 
involved in growing mangoes that are proving 
successful given their higher tolerance to 
the increasingly dry climate. Further, some 
of the respondents indicated that they are 
testing the feasibility of farming green gram 
commercially, along with other non-traditional 
crops that require less water. The customary 
law rules on farming and use of irrigation 
water have consequently been adapted to 
allow for commercial farming and changes in 
cultivation practices. 
The Marakwet case thus points to the 
importance of an effective feedback 
mechanism and suggests that successful 
customary law systems need to include 
a wider base of knowledge inputs that 
encompass not only environmental change 
but economic and social shifts also. As Ostrom 
and Basurto (2011) note, the success of any 
such system is also dependent on an enabling 
environment that facilitates learning from 
the success and failure of others.25 Such an 
informal social learning mechanism can be 
observed in the community habits of the 
Marakwet, whereby customary norms are 
crafted, implemented and enforced by means 
of member consultation—further aided by a 
physical space, the Sambalat trading centre, 
which acts as a hub for irrigation users to 
share experiences. 
3. Inherent Rule Modification Procedure
Bosselman developed this feature by building 
upon Ostrom’s work on rules and game theory 
in the context of institutional arrangements for 
natural resource management.26 It concerns 
a procedure by which any given resource rule 
system can be improved and thus ensure its 
continued relevance in the context of changing 
circumstances. It is both considered an 
essential attribute of system sustainability27 
and requires the maintenance of an open-
minded attitude to rule making by those 
involved—thus assuring congruence between 
rules in use and local conditions. 
As noted, Marakwet’s customary water 
governance system, while based on traditional 
norms and institutions, continues to evolve 
to adapt to changing circumstances. For 
instance, the incorporation of younger men 
into the clan elder council responsible for 
irrigation furrows is one important example 
of institutional flexibility that allows for rule 
modification when needed. 
4. Stratification of Norms
One of the necessary conditions for designing 
an effective feedback mechanism is a rule 
system that is sufficiently stratified. Bosselman 
refers to this feature as ‘fine graininess’,28 and 
involves rules that can be easily modified; that 
partial changes can be made without having 
to affect the entire system. Although this 
feature guarantees the sustainability of the 
rule system rather than the sustainability of 
the resource system, resource sustainability is 
closely associated with a resilient governance 
system that exhibits institutional adaptive 
24 (Bosselman 2005)
26 (Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994)
27 (Ostrom and Basurto 2011)
28 (Bosselman 2005)
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capacity. A system with a great potential to 
deliver sustainable development outcomes 
would be useless if it were to fail in its actual 
operation as a rule system—for example, 
a system whose design requires an entire 
overhaul each time a single rule is changed.
While most rules of the Marakwet’s water 
resource governance system were broadly 
defined, implementation take places through 
consultation with all water users, which 
subjects rules to negotiation and also allows 
them to be modified with relative ease. For 
instance, while there are clear rules on clan 
allocation of water resources from the furrow 
systems, the elders explained that these rules 
could be altered to grant more water resources 
to those families in greater need.29 In other 
words, discretion is sometimes used in the 
application of rules, but this occurs without 
having to change the major institutions that 
fall under customary law. 
5. Autonomy 
Lastly, as was noted in the work of Ostrom 
and Basurto (2011), evidence from research 
on irrigation systems from different countries 
around the world has clearly demonstrated 
that the autonomy of resource users to design, 
operate and modify rules governing the water 
resources they use and depend on, ensured 
better and more equitable outcomes. This 
finding resonates strongly with the analysis 
of the customary law system of the Marakwet, 
where the community itself develops norms. 
The operation and implementation of rules 
is thus in the hands of resource users, with 
such autonomy in rule design regarded as 
inviolable. 
LESSONS FROM OSTROM FOR 
CUSTOMARY LAW SYSTEMS
This paper confirms the parallels that exist 
between CPR governance systems and 
customary law governance systems. While 
the former focus on the normative structures 
(rules in use) for managing shared resources, 
customary law systems for natural resource 
governance are interested in a similar 
institutional framework albeit one where the 
basis of authority rests in informal rather 
than formal/statutory norms and institutions 
and where the focus is the relationship that 
connects actors and their environment to 
those rules. Given these parallels, Ostrom’s 
pioneering work on commons management 
provides a set of most useful insights into the 
operation of resilient customary law systems 
for the governance 
of common pool 
resources, such 
as the irrigation 
system of the 
Marakwet.
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provides a most useful framework for the 
analysis of customary law governance systems. 
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As is the case with successful CPR 
management systems, customary law systems 
must also contain mechanisms to ensure 
adaptability to changing circumstances if 
they are to persist. The analysis presented 
in this paper lends credence to Ostrom’s 
central thesis that ‘tragedy’ is not a necessary 
outcome for commons scenarios and by 
extension customary law systems for natural 
resource governance. As demonstrated 
by the analysis of Marakwet’s customary 
water governance system, autochthonous 
or home grown normative and institutional 
frameworks for governing CPRs, providing 
they can successfully adapt in the face of 
change, can produce positive and sustainable 
resource outcomes.  
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